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Around  the  world,  many  countries  recognise  that  a  highly  educated  and  skilled 
workforce is one of the key drivers of a country’s future progress and prosperity. There is 
therefore a keen interest in what types of educational institutions deliver better outcomes for 
their students. The case of schools, and the policies they pursue, has attracted a large amount 
of attention. For example, a policy  focus  in  many  countries  has  been  placed on  whether 
innovative schooling strategies can offset the problems that have been connected to low pupil 
achievement in state/public schools. Some examples of this kind include learning lessons 
from  the  private  sector  (see  Chakrabarti  and  Peterson,  2008),  giving  more  autonomy  to 
schools (Clark, 2009), increased school accountability (Hanushek and Raymond, 2004), more 
flexible (and extended) teaching times and curriculum innovation (e.g. Abdulkadiroglu et al, 
2009). 
A growing economics of education literature has presented empirical estimates on the 
impact  of  various  school  types  on  pupil  achievement.  For  example,  US  work  on  charter 
schools (publicly funded schools with autonomy levels more like private schools) finds some 
evidence of achievement gains.
1 In England, successive governments have aimed to improve 
pupil performance by increasing the amount of school choice and competition by introducing 
a  number  of  school  types  to  the  English  education  system.
2  Many  parents  have  also 
recognised the link between their children’s educational outcomes and their future prosperity. 
This has led to there being strong connections between house valuations and proximity to 
                                                 
1 This literature is not without controversy. Recent, typically small scale, experimental evaluations of charters in 
particular  US  cities  (Boston  and  New  York)  find  positive  impacts  on  educational  achievement  (see 
Abdulkadiroglu et al, 2009, Dobbie and Fryer, 2009, and Hoxby and Murarka, 2009). Wider coverage non-
experimental evaluations produce more mixed results (CREDO, 2009). 
2  See, for example, Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2008) find that in English community schools there is little 
scope for choice/competition to enhance performance, whilst such a possibility exists in faith schools where 
more autonomy in decision making is present.  
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what parents view as better schools for their children in a number of countries (Black and 
Machin, 2010). This all points to a heightened focus – by both governments and individuals - 
in the kind of schools deliver better outcomes for their children. 
Some nations  are  innovative in  their quest  for  the optimal school  structure, while 
others pursue policies with little deviation from the orthodox model of the local or community 
school. The charter school movement in the US – a movement that allows the managing body 
of the charter schools to gain increased autonomy and that has spread across many states – 
offers one example of an innovative policy regarding school structures. Another example is in 
Sweden where a new type of private school has started operating (self-titled ‘free schools’) 
that compete for students with public schools on an equal financial basis. These free-schools 
are privately managed, but they receive full public funding that is calculated based on the 
number of students that they enrol who live in their local area. One further example is in 
England where a variety of different types of school has been introduced: academy schools – 
the subject of this paper – are probably the most well-known example of a new generation of 
school type.  
The gradual introduction of academy schools has proven to be a controversial area of 
schools policy ever since the first clutch of academies opened in September 2002. Academies 
are  independent,  non-selective,  state-funded  schools  that  fall  outside  the  control  of  local 
authorities. These schools are managed by a private team of independent co-sponsors. The 
sponsors of the academy school delegate the management of the school to a largely self-
appointed  board  of  governors
3  that  has  responsibility  for  employing  all  academy  staff, 
agreeing levels of pay and   conditions  of service with its employees   and deciding on the 
policies for staffing structure, career development, discipline and performance management. 
                                                 
3 An academy usually has around thirteen governors, with seven typically appointed by the sponsor.  
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Supporters  of  academies  argue  that  combining  independence  to  pursue  innovative  school 
policies with the experience of the sponsor will allow academies to drive up the educational 
attainment of their pupils.  
In this paper, we carefully appraise the academy school model. We study the impact of 
academy school conversion on their pupil intake and pupil performance and possible external 
effects working through changes in the pupil intake and pupil performance of neighbouring 
schools. These lines of enquiry are considered over the school years 2001/02 to 2008/09.  We 
bypass  (at  least  some  of)  the  selection  bias  inherent  in  previous  evaluations  of  academy 
schools by comparing the outcomes of interest in academy schools to a specific group of 
comparison schools, namely those state-maintained schools that go on to become academies 
after our sample period ends. This approach enables us to produce a well balanced treatment 
and control group.     
Our  results  suggest  that  moving  to  a  more  autonomous  school  structure  through 
academy conversion  generates a significant improvement in the quality of pupil intake, a 
significant  improvement  in  pupil  performance  and  small  significant  improvements  in  the 
performance of pupils enrolled in neighbouring schools. These results are strongest for the 
schools  that  have  been  academies  for  longer  and  for  those  who  experienced  the  largest 
increase in their school autonomy. These findings matter from an economic perspective, in 
that  they  suggest  the  increased  autonomy  and  flexible  governance  enabled  by  academy 
conversion may have had the scope to sharpen incentives to improve performance. They also 
matter  from  a  public  policy  standpoint  because  recent  years  have  seen  the  increased 
prevalence  of  an  education  system  that  is  being  allowed  to  become  more  and  more 
autonomous.  In  essence,  the  results  paint  a  (relatively)  positive  picture  of  the  academy  
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schools that were introduced by the Labour government of 1997-2010. The caveat is that such 
benefits have, at least for the schools we consider, taken a while to materialise.  
In the next  section of the  paper, we discuss  the nature of secondary schooling in 
England  and  document  the  rise  of  academies.  We  also  describe  how  schools  become 
academies and present a brief summary of related studies. Section 3 describes the data, the 
estimation framework that we adopt and uses this discussion to formulate key hypotheses to 
be tested in the empirical work. Section 4 presents the results on academies. Section 5 reports 
the robustness tests on academies. Section 6 presents the results on neighbouring schools. We 
offer conclusions to the paper in section 7.  
 
2. The Introduction of Academy Schools 
Academies are a relatively  new type of secondary school first introduced into the 
English education system in the early 2000s. In this section, we consider their introduction. 
We discuss how academies relate to the other secondary school types that are in operation in 
England and we document the scale of the rise in the number of academy schools. 
School Types in England 
The English education system has always been characterised by a strong voluntary 
movement that has been actively involved in the delivery of education. Historically these 
voluntary organisations were typically religious and, in the early times of education delivery, 
were the sole providers in England. Over time, the state sector gradually took up a more 
active involvement in providing resources to the education system by first helping to fund 
these early schools. The state then went on to create new schools that had no affiliation with 
the voluntary sector (now known as community schools). However, despite the increased  
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involvement of the state sector, the commitment of the voluntary movement to education has 
never waned: even today, a significant percentage of the schools in the English education 
system are run as a partnership between the voluntary sector and the state sector (these are 
voluntary aided schools, voluntary controlled schools or foundation schools).  
The private sector also has an involvement in England’s education system. This has 
typically taken the  form of privately  funded independent  schools  that  run alongside  state 
funded schools with little private sector involvement in the state funded schools (Machin and 
Wilson, 2008). However, the passing of 1988 Education Act changed this. This act allowed 
the government to form partnerships with the private sector to deliver education. The UK 
government then actively encouraged schools that are public-private ventures as a medium for 
delivering education (for more details, see Machin and Wilson, 2008). The first batch of this 
new  type  of  school  were  city  technology  colleges  (or  CTCs).  In  more  recent  years,  the 
academy school programme has been introduced and, in some important dimensions, this can 
be thought of as a continuation and development of the CTC scheme.  
Taken  together,  there  are  currently  seven  different  school  types  that  make  up  the 
English secondary education system: independent schools, academy schools, city technology 
colleges,  voluntary  aided  schools,  foundation  schools,  voluntary  controlled  schools  and 
community schools. Each school type is characterised by a unique set of features regarding 
their school autonomy and governance. This is shown in Table 1. In this Table, we order the 
different school types by the amount of autonomy that their governing body/management 
body has to make the schooling decisions.  
At the top of the autonomy list is the registered independent school. Such schools are 
able  to  charge  fees.  They  also  possess  a  management  body  that  determines  all  staffing  
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decisions;  the  curriculum  for  the  school;  the  structure  and  length  of  the  school  day;  the 
admissions and pupil selection process; the school budget and all the other policies that the 
school follows. Collectively, the registered independent schools have the most autonomy.  
Academy  schools  share  some  of  the  characteristics  of  independent  schools:  for 
example, an academy school will have a management that determines all staffing decisions; 
the majority of the curriculum for the school (except some core subjects: English, Maths, 
Science and IT); the structure and length of the school day; selecting up to 10% of their intake 
who demonstrate sufficient aptitude and enthusiasm in the specialism that the academy has 
decided  to  follow;  the  school  budget  and  all  the  other  policies  that  the  school  follows. 
However, academy schools cannot charge fees. They are also all-ability schools (except for 
[at most] 10% of their intake): the management/governing body therefore has less scope to 
decide on their admissions compared to independent schools. 
The third type of school on the list is the CTC. We mentioned earlier that the CTCs 
are similar to academy schools. However, the crucial difference is that – unlike an academy 
school - a CTC is obliged to follow the national curriculum in all subjects (Whitty et al., 
1993). The curriculum is also characterised by a strong technological, scientific and practical 
bias, which is not always the case in academy schools. A CTC has less scope to decide the 
curriculum for the school compared to an academy.  
Next on the list is the voluntary-aided school, the foundation school and the voluntary-
controlled school. All of these types of school are run as a partnership between the state sector 
and the voluntary sector. In a voluntary aided school (unlike an academy or a CTC), the 
governing/management body is not responsible for all staffing decisions; the structure and 
length of the school day; or the school budget or any other school policy. The voluntary aided  
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school  is  obliged  to  follow  the  national  curriculum  in  all  subjects.  However,  the 
managing/governing body is responsible for the admissions of the school (in a non-selective 
way) and it is also responsible for all staffing decisions. A foundation school is similar to a 
voluntary aided school, except that the sponsor is not able to appoint the majority of the 
governing body. A voluntary controlled school is similar to a foundation school, except that 
the LEA is responsible for the admissions of the school (in a non-selective way). 
Finally, there is the traditional local community school. These schools are centrally 
organized  through  the  local  education  authority  and  have  rigid  governance  structures.  In 
addition, such schools do not have responsibility for any staffing decisions. These schools 
possess little autonomy, certainly when compared to the other school types in the Table. 
Academy Schools 
  Academy schools are (typically) set up due to any of the following reasons:  to replace 
existing schools (that are often failing); to become an additional school in a particular area; or 
as a means for fee-charging successful schools to broaden their intake of pupils by becoming 
academies (Academies and Independent Schools: Prospectus).  
  Prior to the Academies Act 2010, the path to establish an academy school in a local 
authority involved a number of steps, as set out in Figure 1: 
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The path  to  establishing  an academy school  begins with  the Office of the School 
Commissioner (OSC). They first identify and then explore with local authorities
4 (LAs) the 
opportunities for developing  a new academy school to improve   standards in the lowest 
attaining school(s) or to increase school diversity, parental choice or fair access for parents 
within the local authority. The process enters the brokering phase i f the LA consents to the 
academy school creation and an academy is seen as the right solution to the needs of the LA. 
In this phase, the OSC matches the LA to a sponsor(s). The phase is completed when both the 
LA and the sponsor(s) sign the Statement of Intent. This states that the LA and the sponsor(s) 
will work together to complete a full Expression of Interest (EOI).   
In the EOI phase,  the LA and the sponsor work together to complete a  formal 
document that is known as the Expression of Interest. This shows the need for a new academy 
in the proposed area and should provide more details about the proposed academy such as: the 
age range of the pupils and  the number of pupils that are expected to enrol into the school.  
The phase is completed when the LA and sponsor send the expression of interest  to  the 
Secretary of State for Education  for his or her approval . If the EOI is approved, then the 
process moves on to the feasibility stage.  
During the feasibility stage, a project manager   –  funded  by  the  Department  for 
Education - is appointed to work with the sponsor(s) to develop the project and conduct a 
local consultation with key stakeholders. In this stage, the sponsor(s) will also state a specific 
vision  for  the  academy.  In  addition,  the  sponsor(s)  will  also  state  their  vision  for  the 
                                                 
4 Prior to the Academies Act 2010, the establishment of any academy school in an area required the permission 
of the local authority (National Audit Office 2010). However, following the election in May 2010, the new UK 
government introduced legislation into the Academies Act 2010 which removes the requirement for the local 
authority to approve any plans to create an academy school in its area. For the purposes of this paper, we 
therefore consider only those academy schools that were approved prior to the Academies Act 2010 and we drop 
from our sample any academies that have been approved after this date.  
9 
 
curriculum and structure/length of the school day for the academy. At this stage, there is also 
a requirement for the sponsor(s) to produce a series of documents that show how the proposed 
academy will meet the requirement of raising the educational standards and aspirations in the 
local  area.  This  stage  is  completed  when  the  sponsor(s)  submit  these  documents  to  the 
Secretary of State for Education for his or her approval. If approved, the Department for 
Education  will  enter  into  a  legally  binding  funding  agreement  with  the  sponsor(s).  The 
funding agreement formally states the size, the subject specialism, the location as well as 
other characteristics of the academy, and leads to the creation of a new academy. 
As soon as the funding agreement is signed, the process enters the implementation 
phase. In this phase, new buildings for the academy (if needed) will begin to be built. This 
will also be the time when the assets of the existing school – that are replaced by the academy 
- are transferred from the local authority to the academy trust. The academy will then open as 
soon as possible and will receive state funding – at a level comparable to other local schools – 
according  to  the  number  of  students  that  attend  the  school  (Academies  and  Independent 
Schools: Prospectus). If the academy replaces a school, then the academy will operate in the 
existing buildings for a maximum of three years before moving to new/refurbished buildings. 
In Table 2, we show the number of state-maintained English secondary schools – of 
each school type – in operation over an eight year period beginning in 2002. The definition of 
the different school types are the same as Table 1. The Table shows a marked change in the 
structure  of  English  secondary  schools.  First,  there  is  the  decline  of  the  traditional  ('bog 
standard') community school, second, there is the marked rise in schools with non-traditional 
structures. The marked rise in the number of schools with non-traditional structures is driven 
by large increases in the number of foundation schools and, most importantly for our analysis,  
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academy schools. By 2008/9, there were 130 academies, comprising 4.3 percent of secondary 
schools, and there is a commitment to there being many more in future (see Machin and 
Vernoit, 2010, and the Schools White Paper, 2010). 
In  Table  3,  we  look  at  the  type  of  English  secondary  school  that  converts  to  an 
academy. The Table shows that the vast majority of academy schools are actually academy 
conversions from predecessor schools. The Table also shows that (at least) one school from 
every secondary school type has converted to an academy. However, the majority of academy 
conversions occur in community schools. There is also a marked increase in the number of 
foundation schools that convert to academies as the program has matured.  
In Table 4, we compare the average pre-treatment school characteristics of academy 
schools with the other types of English secondary schools that make up the state maintained 
sector.  We also  look  at these school  characteristics  across different  cohorts of academies 
(based on the first academic year that the academy started operating). We believe that there 
are  a  few  points  worth  highlighting.  The  Table  shows  that  the  pre-treatment  academies 
(schools  prior  to  academy  conversion)  –  compared  to  other  types  of  maintained  English 
secondary school - contain a higher proportion of pupils who are eligible for free school 
meals.  This  is  also  true  for  the  proportion  of  pupils  taking  free  school  meals.  A  logical 
conclusion  to  draw  from  this  Table  is  that  an  academies  pupil  intake  contains  higher 
proportions of poor pupils. The Table also shows that the pupils at pre-treatment academies - 
compared to other types of English secondary schools - miss a higher percentage of half days 
due to unauthorised absences.  
We have also looked at a measure of school performance. The Table shows that the 
pre-treatment academy schools – compared to other types of maintained English secondary  
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schools – contain lower proportions of pupils who achieve the equivalent of five or more 
good  (A*-C)  GCSEs  including  English  and  Maths.  We  also  looked  at  the  key  stage  2 
performance of the pupils (a series of exams that they take at the end of primary school prior 
to going to secondary school). In terms of secondary school attendance, this can be seen as a 
measure  of  pupil-intake  quality.  The  Table  makes  the  clear  point  that  the  pre-treatment 
academies – compared to other types of maintained English secondary schools - enrol a pupil 
intake that has performed less well at key stage 2.  
A  cohort-by-cohort  comparison  shows  some  variation  in  the  pre-treatment  school 
characteristics of the academies. However, despite this variation, all cohorts of academies (if 
analysed  individually  and  compared  to  the  other  types  of  maintained  secondary  school) 
contain higher proportions of poor pupils; experience higher absentee rates; contain lower 
proportions  of  pupils  who  achieve  the  equivalent  of  at  least  five  good  GCSEs  including 
English and Maths; enrol a pupil intake that has performed less well at key stage 2.  
Tables 1 through to 4 display some highly relevant points. There is now a significantly 
larger share of schools that are operating in the English education system that are allowed 
more autonomy and flexibility compared to any other type of maintained secondary schools. 
The  academy  schools  look  like  a  flagship  model.  Compared  to  other  school  types,  these 
schools  in  their  pre-treatment  form  are  both  disadvantaged  and  poorly  performing.  This 
means that any evaluation of the impact of academies on outcomes will also be an assessment 
of whether they are a means of reducing the rich/poor achievement gap. 
Related Studies 
  To date, only a small body of work has explicitly evaluated the impact of academies 
on  educational  outcomes.  The  most  notable  is  a  study  by  Machin  and  Wilson  (2008).  
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However,  there  is  also  a  five  year  evaluation  that  has  been  conducted  by 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC Report, 2008) and there is a report by the National Audit 
Office (2010). Machin and Wilson (2008) look at the improvement in the GCSE performance 
of academy schools compared to the performance of a matched group of schools over the 
same  time  period.  They  find  only  modest  insignificant  improvements.  The  PwC  Report 
(2008) finds higher percentage point increases in the GCSE results of academies compared to 
the  national  average.  However,  Machin  and  Wilson  note  a  number  of  problems  with  a 
comparison of academies with the national average. This, they believe, invalidates the results 
of the PwC Report. It is noteworthy that both Machin and Wilson (2008) and the PwC Report 
(2008) admit that drawing any strong conclusions from their results is precipitous.  
More recently, a NAO report has looked at the performance of academies compared to 
a selected group of maintained schools. Their comparison group is composed of schools with 
similar pupil intakes and performance to the pre-treatment academies. The NAO also exclude 
some academies from their sample: they require all academies to have been open for at least 
two years at the time of writing.
5 They also exclude from their sample any academy that was 
either a former city technology college or a former independent school. They find that there 
has been a significant improvement in  the proportion of pupils achieving the equivalent of 
five or more GCSEs at A*-C grade in the academies compared to the comparison group. This 
result is driven by the relatively more advantaged pupils
6 attending the academy as compared 
to the predecessor school. The report also finds significant improvements in pupil attendance 
at academies compared to comparable schools. 
                                                 
5 This means that they look at the first six cohorts of academy schools.  
6 These pupils are not eligible for free school meals.   
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A related study is by Clark (2009). He looks at grant-maintained (GM) schools
7in 
England in the late 1980s, using a regression-discontinuity design to look at performance and 
competition effects. More specifically, his regression -discontinuity design  exploits the fact 
that schools wishing to become GM schools are required to win the support
8 of the parents 
with children who are currently enrolled at the school. This approach allows Clark to look at 
the performance of narrow GM vote winners compared to the performance of narrow GM 
vote losers. He finds that the narrow GM vote winners experience a significant improvement 
in the proportion of pupils achieving the equivalent of five or more  GCSEs at A*-C grade – 
increasing by roughly 0.25 standard deviations for each additional year the narrow GM vote 
winner  is  open  -  compared  to  the  narrow  GM  vote  losers.  Clark  also  finds  significant 
improvements in pupil attendance at narrow GM vote winners compared to narrow GM vote 
losers.  He  also  finds  improvements  in  student  quality  at  the  narrow  GM  vote  winners 
compared to the narrow GM vote losers. However, he finds that a narrow GM vote win has no 
impact on the neighbouring schools.  
Across the Atlantic, there is more evidence on charter schools. In some regards, this is 
a type of school in the US that is similar to an academy. Some of the more convincing studies 
in this literature exploit the fact that some charter schools use lotteries to allocate places when 
the school is oversubscribed. Examples of this kind include: Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009), 
who estimate the impact of charter attendance on student achievement using Boston data, 
Hoxby and Murarka (2009), which evaluates the effect of the majority of charter schools in 
New York City on their students’ test scores, and Angrist et al. (2010), who evaluate the 
impact of a specific Charter School (in Lynn, Massachusetts) that is run by the Knowledge is 
                                                 
7 GM schools were renamed as foundation schools (see Table 1) in the Schools Act 1998. 
8 This is achieved by winning the majority of a formal vote.  
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Power Program (KIPP) – this is a program that is targeted at low income students that qualify 
for free school meals and was set-up by Teach for America veterans.  
Abdulkadiroglu  et  al.  find  that  the  lotteried  in  pupils  experience  significant 
improvements in their English language scores at both middle and high schools – increasing 
by 0.19 and 0.2 standard deviations respectively for each year that they spend at the charter 
school – compared to the lotteried out pupils.  They find even larger effects for the lotteried in 
pupils in their math scores at both middle and high schools – increasing by 0.43 and 0.32 
standard  deviations  respectively  for  each  year  that  they  spend  at  the  charter  school  – 
compared  to  the  lotteried  out  pupils.  They  also  find  some  evidence  that  the  highest 
achievement gains were achieved by students who were performing particularly poorly before 
they attended the charter school.  
Hoxby  and  Muraka  (2009)  find  that  lotteried  in  pupils  experience  significant 
improvements in both their maths scores and reading scores between the third and eighth 
grade – increasing by 0.09 standard deviations and 0.04 standard deviations respectively for 
each year they spend at the charter school – compared to the lotteried out pupils who remain 
in traditional public schools. They also look at the link between certain school polices and the 
above effects on achievement. They find that a longer school  year/day is associated with 
positive achievement effects. However, the authors are keen to stress that this does not imply 
causation. This is because separating the observable policies from unobservable policies is an 
extremely difficult task (and the procedure is further complicated due to the multicollinearity 
between the observable policies). 
Angrist et al. (2010) find that lotteried in students who attend KIPP Academy Lynn, a 
school  that  serves  students  in  grades  five  through  to  eight,  experience  significant  
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improvements  in  their  maths  scores  and  reading  scores  -  increasing  by  0.35  standard 
deviations and 0.12 standard deviations respectively  for each  year they spend enrolled at 
KIPP  Lynn – compared to  lotteried out  pupils. They  also  find  that students  with  limited 
English proficiency, special educational needs or lower baseline scores experience the highest 
achievement gains in both maths scores and reading scores. In a separate study, Dobbie and 
Fryer (2009)  look  at  schools in  Harlem  in  New York, with  results being broadly similar 
results to those of Angrist et al. (2010). 
However, sometimes lottery based estimates are not possible. Some studies adopt non-
experimental  methods  as  an  alternative,  but  they  tend  to  produce  more  mixed  results  on 
charter schools. For example, CREDO (2009) uses propensity score matching methods. They 
find that a charter schools performance are no better (or worse) than neighbouring traditional 
public schools. One problem with non-experimental methods is that there are concerns about 
how  well  they  deal  with  selection  bias  compared  to  the  lottery  based  estimates.  An 
informative study that addresses this issue is by Hoxby and Murarka (2007). They estimate 
treatment effects for charter schools using both non-experimental methods and lottery based 
estimates.  They  find  that  their  non-experimental  estimates  replicate  their  lottery-based 
estimates.  
The question of whether a charter schools has an impact on the performance of their 
neighbouring  schools  has  only  been  addressed  by  a  few  studies.  Examples  of  this  kind 
include:  Bettinger  (2005),  which  looks  at  the  impact  of  charter  schools  in  Michigan  on 
neighbouring public schools, Hoxby (2002), which evaluates the impact of charter schools in 
Michigan and Arizona on their neighbouring regular public schools, and Booker et al. (2007), 
which looks at the impact of a high concentration of charter schools in Texas on the student  
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achievement  in  traditional  public  schools.    All  three  studies  find  improvements  in  the 
traditional public schools that can be attributed to the introduction of charter schools. 
 
3. Data, Modelling Approach and Key Hypotheses 
  In this section, we discuss the data sources used in this paper. We also discuss the 
approach that we adopt to construct our dataset. In the remaining parts of the section, we 
predesignate the outcomes of interest and outline our definition of a neighbouring school. We 
also describe the modelling approach that we adopt to estimate the impact of academy status 
on the outcomes of interest.    
Data 
In  this  paper,  we  use  the  school  level  characteristics  from  the  Edubase,  School 
Performance  Tables  (SPT)  and  Annual  School  Census  (ASC)  data  sources.  All  three  are 
collected by the Department for Education (DfE). Edubase contains annual data on a number 
of school characteristics – such as the number of pupils who attend the school, the school type 
(e.g.  academy,  CTC,  foundation,  etc.)  and  on  the  admissions  policy  of  the  school  (e.g. 
comprehensive, selective, etc.)  – for all schools in  England and Wales from  the  1999/00 
academic year. The School Performance Tables contain annual data on several performance 
measures – such as the proportion of pupils achieving the equivalent of five or more GCSEs 
at A*-C grade, and the proportion of half days missed due to unauthorised absences – for all 
schools in England from the 1993/1994 academic year.     
In England, all state maintained schools complete an Annual School Census. This is a 
requirement of the Education Act 1996 (Elias and Jones, 2006).  Examples of information 
included in the Annual School Census are the following: the total number of pupils enrolled,  
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the percentage of pupils eligible for free school meals, the total number of qualified teachers, 
the percentage of pupils with special educational needs (either with or without a statement), 
the pupil-teacher ratio and the percentages of pupils from different ethnic groups.  
In addition to the above, we also use data from the National Pupil Database (NPD). 
The NPD is a centrally collected data source that contains the pupil and school characteristics 
(school census) combined with the annual National Curriculum key stage attainment data at 
the  pupil  level.  The  school  census  data  contains  information  on  pupil-level  background 
characteristics– such as whether the pupil has special educational needs (SEN); whether the 
pupil is eligible for free school meals (FSME); the first language of the pupil; the gender of 
the pupil; the school year group of the pupil; the school code for the school that the pupil 
attends; the local education authority (LEA) for the school that the pupil attends; and the 
ethnicity of the pupil – for all pupils in the English maintained sector. This data has been 
collected three times per year (January, May and September) from the 2001/2002 academic 
year. For this paper, we only use the year-on-year January collection because this collection is 
the most available and consistent through time.  
We use the key stage
9 data at KS2 (aged 10/11) and KS4 (aged 15/16) to look at the 
pupil intake and pupil performance of the academies. We also use this key stage data to look 
at the pupil intake and pupil performance of the schools that we designate neighbouring 
schools. The KS2 data is available from the 1995/96 academic year. The KS4 data is available 
from the 2001/02 academic year.  
Dataset Construction 
                                                 
9  In  England,  compulsory  education  is  organised  around  four  key  stages  for  eleven  years  of  compulsory 
schooling from ages 5 to 16.  These are key stage 1 (in years 1 and 2) and key stage 2 (years 3 to 6) in primary 
school; and key stage 3 (years 7 to 9) and key stage 4 (years (10 and 11) in secondary school.   
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In this paper, we analyse the secondary school performance of academies (and their 
neighbours) using their KS4 pupil performance data. However, a nice feature of the KS data 
is that it is possible to match the KS4 results of each pupil to their KS3 results (taken two 
years before) and KS2 results (taken five years before) provided that the pupil remains in a 
state-maintained school in England during this time. That is, for each pupil we match their 
KS4 results over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 academic years to their KS3 results over the 1999/00 
to 2006/07 academic years to their KS2 results over the 1996/97 to 2003/04 academic years. 
We then match each pupil’s school census data at KS4 to our matched KS4-KS3-KS2 dataset. 
However, one slight drawback is that we are not able to match pupils who are enrolled at 
independent schools because the NPD does not collect data from these schools. We have 
therefore taken the decision, in this paper, to only keep the pupils who have been matched at 
all three key stages.
10 
We are able to analyse the pupil-intake of the secondary schools by using the pupil 
year and the school identifier that is contained the pupil’s school census data. This allows us 
to identify – for each year - the pupils that enter year 7 of secondary school. We are then able 
to look at the ‘intake quality’ of each secondary school – for each year - by matching their 
year 7 pupils to their KS2 results. That is, we match each pupil entering year 7 of a secondary 
school over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 academic years to their KS2 results over the 2000/01 to 
2007/08 academic years.  
However, the academy school treatment is at the school level rather than the pupil 
level. We therefore perform our analysis at the school-level for the main results of this paper. 
                                                 
10 This means that pupils who transfer into, or out of, the state maintained sector from KS2 to KS4 are removed from our 
sample. The results are therefore of a localised nature, but given that we successfully match about 91 per cent of students 
across datasets and years the results are still likely to be representative to the majority of the population, and so extrapolation 
of the results to non-academy school pupils still seems reasonable.     
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In  order  to  undertake  the  analysis  at  the  level  of  the  school,  we  use  the  school  code 
information to collapse both the ‘pupil-intake’ dataset and the KS4-KS3-KS2 dataset to the 
level of each individual school. That is, the pupil-level data is collapsed to an average for each 
individual  school.  We  then  match  both  of  these  collapsed  datasets  to  the  school-level 
characteristics  from  the  Edubase,  School  Performance  Tables  (SPT)  and  Annual  School 
Census data sources using the school identifier. This produces a school-level KS4-KS3-KS2 
dataset over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 academic years and a school-level pupil intake dataset 
over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 academic years. We keep only the yearly observations - for each 
school - that are matched to every source. We understand that that there are no differences in 
the calculation of any of these data sources across school types, and therefore a comparison 
across school types using the same data sources is appropriate in this instance.  
One further issue concerns the schools that convert to academies. There are some 
examples where a number of schools combine to create one academy school. Where this 
occurs,  we  create  one  hypothetical  pre-academy  school.  This  adopts  hypothetical 
characteristics that are a weighted-average – based on their student population at the time of 
the merge - of the characteristics of the merged schools.  
Outcomes of Interest 
The main focus of this paper is the impact of academy school conversion on their 
pupil intake and pupil performance. In addition to this, we also examine its impact on the 
pupil intake and pupil performance of neighbouring schools. In order to isolate the impact of 
an academy conversion on these outcomes, we define the academic year that the academy 
status is awarded as the first academic year that the academy school starts operating (‘opens  
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for business’). We then use the academic year that the academy status is awarded (and the 
years after) as the base that we need to calculate the policy effect. 
We investigate the impact of academy school conversion on their pupil intake and the 
pupil intake of neighbouring schools by looking at the KS2 performance of their pupils. This 
is calculated based on the average standardised KS2 total points score (with a population 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one) of the pupils who enrol into year 7 of the 
academy/neighbouring school (the first year of secondary school).  
We investigate the impact of an academy school conversion on its pupil performance 
and the pupil performance of neighbouring schools by looking at the KS4 performance of 
these pupils. The main measure of KS4 performance that we use in this paper is the average 
standardised proportion of pupils enrolled into the school who achieve the equivalent of five 
or more GCSEs at A*-C grade including English and Maths (with a population mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one).       
We define a ‘neighbouring school’ as any maintained secondary school that is within a 
3-mile radius of a school that has been granted academy status over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 
academic  years.  This  classification  of  a  ‘neighbouring  school’  is  somewhat  arbitrary. 
However, this classification ensures that the distance between a neighbouring school and the 
relevant academy is both large enough to include a sufficiently large number of schools. The 
classification also ensures that the distance is small enough to include the schools that are the 
most likely to experience an academy effect. In order to isolate the impact of academy status 
on  the  performance  of  their  neighbouring  schools,  we  assume  a  discrete  academy  effect 
characterised  by  a  single  jump.  We  also  define  the  year  that  a  school  first  became  a 
‘neighbouring school’ as the first academic year that the relevant academy school opens. We  
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then use this year (and the years after) as the base that we need to calculate the policy effect 
on the neighbouring schools.  
Modelling Approach 
We use a school-level difference-in-difference method to estimate the impact of an 
academy school conversion on its pupil intake and its pupil performance. We use the same 
approach to identify its impact on the pupil intake and pupil performance of neighbouring 
schools. That is, we estimate the impact of the academy school conversion on its pupil intake 
and  performance  by  comparing  the  average  change  in  these  outcomes,  before  and  after 
conversion, relative to a set of control schools. Similarly, we estimate the impact of academy 
school conversion on the pupil intake and pupil performance of its neighbouring schools by 
comparing the average change in the performance of the neighbouring schools, before and 
after conversion, relative to a set of control schools. Using this method, we can exploit the 
variation in the degree of school autonomy – due to the award of academy school status – to 
isolate  the  impact  on  its  pupil  intake,  its  performance,  the  pupil  intake  of  neighbouring 
schools and the pupil performance of neighbouring schools. In this approach, we assume a 
‘one-time effect’ on the outcomes of interest. That is, we do not allow the estimated academy 
effect to be a function of time. The key parameter of interest is the difference in difference 
coefficient ʴ in the following equation: 
J
st s t s st 1j jst 1st
j=0




where y denotes the outcome of interest for school s in year t, A is a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 for every school in our treatment group and it is equal to 0 for every school in our 
control group; PolicyOn is a dummy variabl e equal to 1 for each school s in  year t for  the 
year, and the years after,  the academy status has been  awarded and it is otherwise equal to  
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zero, X denotes a set of control variables, ʱs denotes school fixed effects, ʱt denotes year fixed 
effects (included to take account of the year-by-year effects that common to all schools) and u 
is an error term. 
In the second difference-in-difference method, we allow for cohort specific variations 
in  the  academy  impact,  ʴc,  where  c  denotes  the  academy  cohort.
11  This is shown in the 
following equation:   
7J
st s t c sc st 2j jst 2st
c=1 j=0
y = ʱ + ʱ +  A PolicyOn + + u ʴ * λ X   
 
(2) 
In the third difference-in-difference method, we allow for time of academy effects by placing 
schools awarded earlier  and later academy status  into different  groups.  We then estimate a 
separate ʴ coefficient for each group, ʴg, where g denotes the academy cohort group. The 
label 1 represents the earlier academy cohort group. The label 2 represents the later academy 
cohort group.
12 This is shown in the following equation: 
2J
st s t g sg st 3j jst 3st
g=1 j=0
y = ʱ + ʱ +  A PolicyOn + + u ʴ * λ X   
 
(3) 
Definition of Comparison Schools 
In order to identify the causal impact of the academy conversion (school autonomy 
increase) on the outcomes of interest – in any of the above methods – we need to assume that 
the evolution of the outcomes of interest for the treatment group (in the absence of treatment) 
will  behave  in  an  identical  manner  as  the  control  group.  As  already  described  in  the 
discussion around Table 4, this is a problem in the case of academies because academy status 
has been awarded to many poorly performing problem schools.  This means that a naive 
                                                 
11 In doing so, we place every academy school (both before and after conversion) into a group according to the 
opening year of the academy. There are a total of seven academy cohorts in the treatment group.  
12 We have placed the first five cohorts of academies (both before and after conversion) into the earlier academy 
cohort group. We have placed the last two cohorts of academies (both before and after conversion) in the later 
academy cohort group.    
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comparison between academy schools and all other state-maintained schools is likely to suffer 
from  significant  selection  bias.  A  related  problem  is  that  schools  that  go  on  to  become 
academies  may  all  share  particular  unobservable  characteristics  (e.g.  they  have  a  type  of 
school ethos that is more in line with the academy model). 
We  believe  that  is  possible  to  bypass  both  of  these  problems  by  comparing  the 
outcomes of interest in academy schools to a specific, selected group of control schools. This 
group  consists  of  state-maintained  schools  in  our  sample  periods  that  go  on  to  become 
academies  after  the  sample  periods  end.  That  is,  we  define  the  treatment  group  as  all 
academies (both before and after conversion) that gained academy status over the 2001/02 to 
2008/09 academic years. We define the control group as all state maintained schools that were 
approved, prior to the Academies Act 2010, to become academies after the 2008/09 academic 
year. 
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of academy status on the outcomes of 
interest, we need two crucial assumptions to hold. Firstly, we need there to be no effect of the 
treatment group on the control group. In other words, we need to be able to rule out the 
possibility of any academy having an impact on any school that is in the control group. This is 
known as the no spillovers assumption. Secondly, we need the evolution of the outcomes of 
interest for the treatment group (in the absence of treatment) to behave in an identical manner 
as the control group.  
The feasibility of the zero spillover assumption could depend on the distance between 
the academies in the treatment group and the schools that make up the control group. In this 
paper, the median distance between the academies (treatment group) and the future academies 
(control  group)  is  one-hundred  and  seventy-one  kilometres.  We  believe  that  the  median  
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distance between the treatment group and the control group is sufficiently large to mean that 
any academy effect (if any) on the future academies is likely to be small. However, this is 
difficult to formally test. To take account of the possibility that there may be a spillover effect 
influencing  the  reported  results,  we  perform  a  robustness  check  in  section  5  below  that 
reduces the sample of control schools by excluding the schools that are located particularly 
close to an academy school in the treatment group. More specifically, we reduce the sample 
of  control  schools  by  excluding  any  school  from  the  control  group  that  is  within  three 
kilometres of an academy school in the treatment group. This has the effect of reducing the 
sample of control schools by ten per cent. We then use the reduced sample of control schools 
as a robustness check. This robustness check will allow us to get a feel for the potential size 
of any spillover effect. That is, if we find that this robustness check has little effect upon the 
estimated  academy  effect  then  this  suggests  that  the  impact  of  (any)  spillover  effects  – 
between the treatment and control group - is minimal.  
To assess the likelihood of the ‘identical evolution’, or common trends, assumption 
holding, we first look at the pre-treatment mean characteristics of the schools in the treatment 
group compared to the schools in the control group. These balancing tests offer an important 
check of our research design. In Table 5 (Panel A), we show the mean pre-treatment school-
level  characteristics  of  the  current  academies  compared  to  the  same  mean  school-level 
characteristics of the future academies over the 2001/02 to 2007/08 period. We also report the 
results of a difference in means test with clustered standard errors at the school level. They 
show that, prior to treatment, the average school level characteristics of the current academies 
are  very  similar  to  the  average  school  level  characteristics  of  the  future  academies.  For 
example, out of the eleven estimated differences in these school-level characteristics, we find  
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that there is only one significance difference (at the 5% level of significance) between the 
current academies compared to the future academies. The one significant difference between 
the current  academies  compared to the future  academies  is that the  pre-treatment  current 
academies seem to enrol a significantly higher proportion of non-white pupils compared to 
the future academies.  
The results from Table 5 (Panel A) are encouraging. However, we believe that it is 
possible to do better. This can be achieved by performing two balancing procedures that will 
increase the similarity of the schools in the treatment group and the schools in the control 
group. Firstly, we exclude any school from either the treatment group or the control group 
that has missing observations or gaps in our dataset over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 period. In 
practice, this means that we have complete data for every school in either our treatment group 
or our control group for every academic year in the 2001/02 to 2008/09 period. It also means 
that there must be a predecessor school with full data for all of the schools in either the 
treatment  group  or  the  control  group.
13  This procedure prevents our res ults from being 
distorted by missing observations or gaps.  Secondly, we adopt a propensity score matching 
strategy on the balanced panel of schools in the treatment group and the control group . That 
is, we estimate the propensity score
14 for being a current academy for both the treatment 
schools and the control schools   using the pre-treatment characteristics. We then use the 
propensity score for each school in each year to calculate kernel weights for each school using 
                                                 
13 This has the effect of excluding any academy school that was previously an independent school because we 
have no pre-academy data for such schools. We also exclude any new academy for similar reasons. 
14 This uses relevant pre-treatment observable characteristics – such as the proportion of pupils eligible for free 
school meals (we report the result in Appendix Table A1) - to estimate the propensity score (or likelihood) of 
each school becoming an academy in our sample period. This is estimated using a logit specification.   
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a kernel matching method.
15 The aim of this approach is to balance the distribution of the pre-
treatment X characteristics for the treatment and control schools.  
In  Table  5  (P anel  B),  we  report  the  same  mean  pre-treatment  school-level 
characteristics for the matched current academies compared to the matched future academies 
(using their kernel weights) over the 2001/02 to 2007/08 period. The Table shows that, prior 
to treatment, our matching strategy appears to achieve the aim of balancing the distribution of 
the pre-treatment X characteristics in the treatment and control schools. That is, there are no 
significant differences in the reported pre-treatment characteristics of the matched treatment 
group compared to the matched control group. Given this result, we believe that the ‘identical 
evolution’ assumption is more likely to hold if we use the matched treatment group and the 
matched control group. We do, however, show results based on the unmatched comparison in 
the robustness tests we consider after the main results. 
To further assess the likelihood of the ‘identical evolution’ assumption holding, we 
look at whether the matched current academies and the matched future academies experience 
different pre-reform time trends in either the mean KS2 total points score of their year 7 
intake or the proportion of their pupils who achieve the equivalent of five or more GCSEs at 
A*-C grade including English and Maths. We also look at whether there are any (systematic) 
differences in either the mean KS2 total points score of their year 7 intake or the proportion of 
pupils who achieve the equivalent of five or more GCSEs at A*-C grade including English 
and Maths for the matched current academies compared to the matched future academies in 
any of the pre-treatment periods.  
The results from both of these methods are reported in Table 6. Panel A presents the 
results from a linear trend model. The estimated coefficient on the interaction of the time 
                                                 
15 This uses an Epanechnikov function with a constant bandwidth.   
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trend with the current academy indicator indicates whether there is a significant difference in 
the  pre-treatment  time  trend  in  the  KS2  test  scores  of  the  matched  current  academies 
compared to the matched future academies. The column (1) estimate shows an insignificant 
trend difference in the KS2 test scores of the year 7 intake in the pre-treatment years.  
If we look at the pre-treatment KS4 performance of the matched current academies 
compared  to  the  matched  future  academies  (in  column  (2)),  we  also  see  no  significance 
difference  in  the  time-trend  in  the  KS4  performance  for  the  matched  current  academies 
compared to the matched future academies.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of a model that compares the level of our 
outcomes of interest through time. It shows that there is no significant difference between the 
matched current academies and the matched future academies in the pre-treatment levels (in 
any  pre-treatment  period)  for  either  KS2  test  scores  of  their  year  7  intake  or  the  KS4 
performance of their pupils. In Panel B, we also report the results of an F-Test that looks at 
whether the interaction terms in Panel B are jointly equal to zero. The results of the F-Test 
(for both outcomes of interest) show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the interaction 
terms are jointly equal to zero – this further supports the conclusion that there is no significant 
pre-treatment  difference  between  our  matched  current  academies  and  our  matched  future 
academies.  
We believe these results to be convincing and strongly validate our comparison group 
of schools. The results show that the pre-treatment matched current academies and matched 
future academies have very similar observable characteristics. They are also very similar in 
both their pre-treatment trends and their pre-treatment levels in the outcomes of interest. This 
suggests  that  the  matched  future  academies  are  a  suitable  control  group  for  the  matched  
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current  academies.  To  estimate  the  difference  in  difference  models  described  above  in 
equations (1)-(3) we use the kernel weights to obtain estimates of the impact of an academy 
school conversion on its pupil intake and its pupil performance.
16 We also adopt a similar 
procedure to estimate the impact of an academy school conversion on the pupil intake and 
pupil performance of neighbouring schools. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we report estimates of the impact of the academy school conversion on 
its pupil intake and its pupil performance using the approach that we outlined in section 3. 
Academies and Pupil Intake 
In Table 7, we investigate whether an academy school conversion has an impact on 
the pupil-intake of the  school.  We track the pupil-intake quality of  each school  over the 
2001/02 to 2008/09 period by using the average standardised KS2 total points score of their 
year 7 pupils. This Table uses four different specifications to report estimates of the impact of 
academy status on its pupil intake. We begin with the raw difference-in-difference in column 
(1). We add time-varying controls in column (2). In column (3), we estimate heterogeneous 
effects for different cohorts of academies, and in column (4), we place the first five academy 
cohorts  from  the  treatment  group  into  an  early  group  and  we  place  the  remaining  two 
academy cohorts of academy school into a late group. We then estimate a separate academy 
effect for each group. 
The estimated coefficients in the Table show that there has been a significant increase 
in the KS2 test scores for the year 7 pupils who have enrolled into an academy. This suggests 
                                                 
16  We  estimate  the  academy  effects  using  a  sample  that  consists  of  102  current  academies  and  97  future 
academies.  This  is  all  the  current  academies  and  future  academies  that  are  left  after  the  dataset  has  been 
constructed in the way we have outlined and the balancing procedures have been completed.   
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that (on average) the schools that convert to academies experience a sharp and significant 
increase in the ‘quality’ of their pupil intake at year 7. Column (1) shows the key stage 2 total 
points score of the year 7 pupils enrolled into an academy is 0.224 standard deviations higher 
due to the academy conversion. The intake quality (on average) significantly increases by 
0.202 standard deviations when we add the controls in column (2). The estimates in columns 
(3) and (4) show that the quality of intake measured by primary school test scores seems to 
have increased by more in the earlier academy conversions. In column (4), the 'early' cohort 
conversions (cohorts 1 to 5, in school years 2002/3 to 2006/7) saw an increase in the KS2 
performance of their year 7 intake by 0.311 standard deviations, as compared to an increase of 
less than one-third of that (0.103 of a s.d.) in the 'later' conversions (cohorts 6 to 7, in school 
years 2007/8 to 2008/9). 
These results suggest that (on average) there has been a step-change in the pupil intake 
of schools when they convert to academy status. Such schools are attracting and admitting 
higher ability pupils once they convert to academy status. One interpretation of these results is 
that  higher  ability  pupils  may  be  substituting  away  from  other  schools  to  the  academy 
schools.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  we  believe  that  this  substitution  will  generate  a  more 
pronounced  impact  on  the  neighbouring  schools  (given  the  closeness  in  proximity).  This 
highlights the importance of checking for any external effects from the academies to their 
neighbouring schools.  
Academies and Pupil Achievement 
  We next consider whether an academy school conversion has an impact on the KS4 
performance of its pupils. This is considered in Table 8. The Table is set-up in the same way 
as Table 7 except that is has an additional column. Column (1) shows that an academy school  
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conversion increases the proportion of their pupils who achieve the equivalent of five or more 
GCSEs  at  A*-C  grade  including  English  and  Maths  by  an  insignificant  0.095  standard 
deviations.  This  (average)  performance  effect  changes  to  an  insignificant  0.071  standard 
deviations with the addition of the controls in column (2). The estimates in column (3) and (4) 
reveal a striking finding. They show that the performance improvements due to the academy 
conversion are substantially higher in the earlier academy conversions. In column (4), the 
‘early’  cohort  conversions  saw  an  increase  in  their  KS4  performance  by  a  statistically 
significant 0.181 standard deviations, as compared to the ‘later’ cohort conversions that saw a 
decrease in their KS4 performance by an insignificant of 0.029 standard deviations. In column 
(5), we check whether these performance improvements can be (at least partially) explained 
by the academies admitting a pupil intake with higher ability. That is, we make use of the 
KS2 test scores of the pupils who are now taking their KS4 exams by including their average 
KS2 standardised total points score as an additional control. We see that the performance 
improvements for the early cohort conversions remain after we take account of the KS2 test 
scores of these pupils. That is, the performance improvements cannot be explained by the 
increased prevalence of higher ability pupils in the academies.  
The results of Table 8 suggest that KS4 performance has significantly improved for 
the earlier  cohorts that convert to  an academy  school. On average,  there  seems  to  be an 
increase the proportion of pupils who achieve the equivalent of five or more GCSEs at A*-C 
grade  including  English  and  Maths  by  0.181  standard  deviations  for  the  ‘early’  cohort 
conversions.  These  performance  improvements  are  not  trivial.  It  reflects  a  performance 
improvement of approximately 16% in the average pre-treatment baseline for the early cohort  
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academy conversion. They are also broadly consistent with the Hoxby and Muraka (2009) 
results on charter schools.
17 
Variation by Pre-Academy School Type (Autonomy Distance) 
  In this section, we exploit the fact that five different types of secondary school in the 
state-maintained sector have converted to an academy school. The managing/governing body 
in each of these five different school types (prior to the academy conversion) possess different 
degrees of autonomy (see Table 1). This means that that the amount of autonomy that each 
type of school gains by converting to an academy will vary. In Table 9, we show the type of 
English secondary school that converts to an academy. However, unlike Table 3, this is only 
shown for the current academies (cohort 1 to cohort 7) and future academies (cohort 8 to 
cohort 10) that remain after the balancing processes have been completed. 
To consider differences by 'autonomy distance' we amend the earlier difference-in-
difference method, allowing the different types of school that convert to academies to have 
different ʴ coefficients. That is, we place the different school types that convert to academies 
(see Table 3) into separate groups. We then use these pre-academy type groups to estimate a 
separate ʴ coefficient for each group, where ʴd denotes the 'autonomy distance' associated 
with an academy conversion from the five different predecessor school types.
18 This is shown 
in the following equation: 
5J
st s t d sd st 4j jst 4st
d=1 j=0
y = ʱ + ʱ +  A PolicyOn + + u ʴ * λ X   
 
(4) 
                                                 
17 Once you take account of the fact that the Hoxby and Muraka estimates are per year spent at the charter 
school. 
18 We have placed the academies (both before and after conversion) into f ive pre-academy type groups: a CTC 
group, a voluntary aided school group, a foundation school group, a voluntary controlled school group and a 
community school group. We are not able to calculate a separate  ʴ coefficient for the independent schools that 
convert to academies because we have no pre-conversion data on independent schools.       
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Finally, we allow for heterogeneity by both autonomy distance and early/late academy 
conversion.
19 This is shown in the following equation:  
10 J
st s t dg sdg st 5j jst 5st
dg=1 j=0
y = ʱ + ʱ +  A PolicyOn + + u ʴ * λ X   
 
(5) 
where  dg denotes  a group  that  reflects both  the  pre-academy  type  group  and  the early/late 
academy cohort group. 
In Table 10, we show coefficient estimates from equations (4) and (5). In column (1) 
and column (2), we look at the impact of an academy conversion on the quality of the pupil-
intake of the school. In column (3), column (4), column (5) and column (6)  we look at the 
impact of an academy school conversion on the KS4 performance of their pupils. 
The Table shows there to be considerable variation in the estimated academy effect for 
the  different  types  of  schools  that  convert  to  academies.   In  column  (1) ,  we  see  that  (on 
average) there are sharp significant increases in intake quality for the voluntary aided schools, 
voluntary controlled schools and the community schools that convert to an academy school. 
However, there is also (on average) a significant reduction in the intake quality for the CTCs 
that  convert  to  an  academy  school.  In  column  (2),  we  also  see  that  there  is  considerable 
variation in the estimated effects for the early cohort conversions compared to the later cohort 
conversions  within  each  school  type  that  has  converted  to  an  academy.  However,  it  is 
important to bear in mind that many more community schools convert to an acade my school 
compared to the numbers from other types of academy school conversions. This means that it 
will (largely be) the community school conversions that are driving both the overall increase 
                                                 
19 We have placed the academies (both before and after conversion) into ten groups that reflect both the pre-
academy  type  group  and  the  academy  cohort  group:  an  earlier  CTC  group;  a  later  CTC  group;  an  earlier 
voluntary aided school group; a later voluntary aided school group; an earlier foundation school group; a later 
foundation school group; an earlier voluntary controlled school group; a later voluntary controlled school group; 
an earlier community school group and a later community school group.      
33 
 
in the KS2 test scores of the pupil intake and the more pronounced increase in the pupil-
intake quality for the earlier cohort conversions.  
In  column  (3),  we  see  that  (on  average)  the  community  schools  that  convert  to 
academies  have  experienced  a  significant  increase  in  the  KS4  performance  due  to  the 
academy conversion. There are no significant performance improvements (on average) in any 
of the other types of schools that convert to an academy. It is of interest that these effects 
remain after we control for the KS2 results for these pupils (as shown in column (4)). 
Column (5) shows that (on average) it is only the early voluntary controlled schools 
and the early community schools that have experienced a significant improvement in the 
performance of their pupils due to the academy conversion. However, it is again important to 
bear in mind the numbers of early community schools that have converted to an academy 
school compared to the other types of schools that convert to an academy. This again means 
that it will (largely be) the early community school conversions that are driving the overall 
performance improvements for the early cohort academy conversions. In column (6), we see 
that these effects remain after we control for the KS2 results of these pupils.  
The  results  of  Table  10  reveal  an  important  finding  in  terms  of  the  overall 
interpretation of our results. They suggest that the schools that experience the largest increase 
in  the  amount  of  their  school  autonomy  due  to  the  academy  conversion  (see  Table  1)  – 
voluntary controlled schools and community schools – experience the greatest performance 
improvements  due  to  the  academy  conversion.  Such  schools  gain  responsibility  for  the 
majority of the curriculum of the school (except the core subjects: English, Maths, Science 
and IT); the structure and length of the school day; selection of up to 10% of their pupil-
intake; the school budget and all staffing decisions (in the case of community schools that  
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convert to academies). In addition to this, we also find a similar relationship between the size 
of  the  school  autonomy  increase  (due  to  the  academy  conversion)  and  its  impact  on  the 
quality of its pupil intake in year 7. We are reluctant to draw strong conclusions from the 
results from column (2) and column (5) because most of the estimates are based on only a 
relatively small number of schools. Nonetheless, we believe that the variation in the estimated 
academy effects across the different school types is interesting and they do suggest that the 
schools that gain the largest increase in autonomy experience the greatest increase in their 
pupil quality and the greatest increase in their pupil performance.  
 
5. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we appraise the sensitivity of our results on the impact of an academy 
conversion on their pupil intake and pupil performance. It is important to test the robustness 
of the estimated academy effects that we report in the previous section to see if they can be 
explained  by  other  factors  and  that  they  are  not  necessarily  due  to  an  academy  school 
conversion. Results from a barrage of tests of robustness are therefore reported in Table 11. In 
all cases, we compare the estimates to our original specification when we estimated equation 
(3),  which  produced  the  results  that  are  reported  in  Tables  7  and  8,  column  (4).  For 
convenience, we re-report these results in column (1) of Table 11. In Panel A, we report the 
robustness tests when the dependent variable is the KS2 standardised total points score for the 
pupil who enrol into year 7 of each school in each year. In Panel B, we report the robustness 
tests when the dependent variable is the standardised proportion of pupils who achieve the 
equivalent of five or more GCSEs at A*-C grade including English and Maths for each school 
in each year.    
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The first robustness test, which is displayed in column (2) of table 11, considers the 
definition of treatment and control schools. Throughout the analysis to date, we have used a 
treatment group that consists of all seven cohorts of academies that have actually become 
academies  before  our  sample  period  ends.  Similarly,  we  have  used  a  control  group  that 
consists of state-maintained schools in our sample periods that have been given final approval 
(prior to the Academies Act 2010) to become academies after our sample period end. It is 
therefore important to check the sensitivity of our results to a definition of the treatment and 
control schools that is based on the end year of our sample period, which in this case is the 
2008/09 academic year. That is, we reduce the sample period year end by one year and this 
has the effect of switching the cohort 7 academies from the treatment group to the control 
group.
20 This is an indirect test of the sensitivity of the results to a definition of the treatment 
group and a control group that is determined by the end of our sample period that may not be 
representative of other years that could have been the end of our sample period. When we 
adopt this approach, the effect is to reduce the ʴ coefficients for the early cohort conversions 
in both Panel A and Panel B. In both cases, however, the estimated ʴ coefficients remain 
significantly different from zero. This is reversed when we look at the ʴ coefficients for the 
later cohort conversions. That is, they increase but remain insignificant.  
In column (3), we present the estimates of the ʴ coefficients where we reduce our 
sample of control schools (future academies) by 10%. This has the effect of removing all 
schools in our control group that are within 3km of the treatment group. The procedure is an 
indirect way of looking at the potential size of any spillover effects from the treatment group 
to the control group. The Table shows that this has little impact on either the size or the 
significance of the estimated ʴ coefficients.  
                                                 
20 All other cohorts of academies remain in the same treatment/control group and early/late cohort group.   
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We conduct a falsification test in column (4) and column (5). This is a test of whether 
the estimated ʴ coefficients reflect unaccounted pre-existing differences in the outcomes of 
interest  for  our  treatment  group  compared  to  our  control  group.  To  do  this  falsification 
exercise, we alter the year in which each cohort of academy school became an academy to 
that of an earlier time period. We then re-estimate equation (3) but calculate the ʴ coefficients 
based on the ‘fake’ year in which the schools convert to academies. If the ʴ coefficients in this 
falsification exercise give similar results to that of our original specification then the implied 
results of our original specification can largely be accounted for by unaccounted pre-existing 
differences in the outcomes of interest. To avoid any contamination when schools actually 
convert to academies and when their ‘fake’ conversion occurred it is necessary (for each 
school) for there to be no overlap between their fake post-academy years and their actual 
post-academy years. This means that we have to shorten the post-treatment fake periods for 
the first two academy cohorts. It is also necessary for there to be observational points in at 
least one ‘fake’ pre-academy year. We have KS2 data from the 1995/96 academic year. This 
means we have year 7 intake data with matched KS2 results from the 1996/97 academic year. 
We therefore use the 1996/97 academic year as the first ‘fake’ pre-academy year. However, 
because the KS4 performance data that we use in our original specification only begins in the 
2001/02 academic year, we use a comparable performance measure taken from the school 
performance tables for these falsification tests. This allows us to perform the falsification test 
over the same periods for both Panel A and Panel B. We conduct the falsification exercise 
over the eight year period between the 1996/97and 2003/04 academic years.  
The actual structure of the falsification test in shown in the Appendix Table A2. It 
shows for each academy school cohort the years in which the ‘fake’ academy conversion  
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occurs compared to what actually happens. We then use this set-up to estimate  coefficients 
using these fake policy years (as shown in Appendix Table A2) to re-estimate equation (3). In 
column (4) of Table 11, we see that the estimated ʴ coefficients are close to zero and become 
statistically insignificant. In column (5), we take account of the fact that the introduction of 
CTC schools during this fake-policy period may contaminate our results by dropping former 
CTC schools from both the treatment group and the control group. This has little impact on 
the significance of the estimated ʴcoefficients, which remain small and insignificant.  
In column (6) and column (7) we revert back to our original sample period, however, 
we alter the modelling approach that we adopt to estimate equation (3). In column (6), we 
estimate equation (3) without any weighting and estimate the academy effect by comparing 
the  unmatched  current  academies  to  the  unmatched  future  academies.  In  column  (7),  we 
estimate the likelihood of being a current academy for our treatment group and control group 
using a non-linear probit model (as opposed to a logit model that is used in the original 
specification) using the same controls as our original specification. We then proceed with the 
same kernel matching method as the original specification. Both of these procedures have 
little impact on either the size or the significance of the estimated ʴcoefficients. 
In column (8), we look at  whether our  estimated academy  effects hold  if we use 
similar  dependent  variables  and  are  not  specific  to  the  dependent  variables  that  we  have 
chosen to use in our original specification. In Panel A, we change the dependent variable to 
the KS2 standardised mean points score for the pupils who enrol into year 7 of each school in 
each year. In Panel B, we investigate the idea that the performance improvements that we 
observe in our original specification are largely being drive by performance improvements in 
unconventional  subjects.  To  investigate  whether  or  not  this  is  occurring  we  change  the  
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dependent variable in Panel B to the standardised proportion of pupils who achieve five or 
more GCSEs at A*-C grade including English and Maths for each school in each year. That 
is, we drop the equivalent term that is used in the original specification and have a specific 
requirement that they are actually GCSEs. The column shows that changing the dependent 
variables that are used in Panel A and Panel B has little impact on either the size or the 
significance of our estimated ʴ coefficients.  
Finally, in column (9), we compare the short-term academy effects for the early cohort 
conversions compared to the later cohort conversions. That is, we restrict the post-academy 
periods for each academy school so that there is a maximum of one post-academy period. For 
example, we estimate the academy effects for an academy school that opens in the 2005/06 
academic year using all pre-treatment periods (in this case, 2001/02 to 2004/05) but only one 
post-treatment period (in this case, 2005/06 only). We then use this approach to compare the 
short-run academy effects for the early academy cohort conversions compared to the later 
academy  cohort  conversions.  This  can  be  thought  of  as  an  indirect  test  of  whether  the 
difference in the estimated effects for the early cohort conversions compared to the later 
cohort conversions is (largely) due to the early cohort academies operating (as academies) for 
a longer amount of time. That is, if we find that the estimated short term academy effects for 
the early academy cohort conversions are similar to the estimated short term academy effects 
for the later cohort conversions then this would suggest that the estimated academy effects are 
a function of time. In Panel A, we see that the estimated short term academy effects on their 
pupil intake are different for the early academy cohort conversions compared to the later 
academy cohort conversions. The sharp significant increase in the pupil-intake quality for the 
early  academy  cohort  conversions  occurs  in  the  short  term,  where  as  there  is  no  sharp  
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significant increase in the pupil-intake quality in the later academy cohort conversions in the 
short term. This suggests that the early academy cohort conversions experience a change in 
their pupil-intake quality in the short term that is different to the short term change in the 
pupil-intake quality of the later academy cohort conversions. In essence, this suggests that  
the reported changes to the pupil-intake quality in our original specification are not due to a 
function  of  time  and  we  therefore  cannot  be  confident  that  the  later  academy  cohort 
conversions  will  experience  (if  given  more  time)  a  similar  increase  in  their  pupil-intake 
quality.  In  Panel  B,  we  see  that  the  estimated short  term  academy  effects  on  their  pupil 
performance for the early academy cohort conversions compared to the later academy cohort 
conversions are similar in both their size and their significance. This suggests that the early 
academy cohort conversions experience a change in their pupil performance in the short term 
that is similar to the short term change in the pupil performance of the later academy cohort 
conversions. In essence, this suggests that the reported changes to the pupil performance in 
our original specification are likely to be due to the increased operating time of the early 
academy cohort conversions. We are therefore (reasonably) confident that the later academy 
cohort  conversions  will  experience  (if  given  more  time)  a  similar  increase  in  their  pupil 
performance. 
To summarise, the results of Table 11 show our results to be highly robust to a number 
of checks. These include: altering the definition of the treatment and control schools by using 
a different period to end our sample; removing schools from the control group that are within 
3km of a school in our treatment group (such schools are likely to be particularly susceptible 
to  spillover  effects  from  the  treatment  group  to  the  control  group);  a  falsification  test;  a  
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change  in  the  modelling  approach  that  we  adopt  and  also  to  a  change  in  the  dependent 
variable. We are therefore confident that the results from our original specification are robust.  
 
6. External Effects on Neighbouring Schools 
In this section, we report estimates of the impact of academy school conversion on the 
pupil intake and the pupil performance of neighbouring schools using the approach that we 
outlined in section 3.  There  are  no  strong  a  priori  predictions  from  economic  theory 
regarding the likely impact of academies on the pupil intake and the pupil performance of 
their neighbouring schools. On the one hand, there may be beneficial pupil intake effects, 
which  stem  from  neighbourhood  compositional  changes  due  to  the  introduction  of  an 
academy school into a specific area, and there may be beneficial performance effects, which 
stem  from  increased  choice/competition  and  also  from  the  sharing  of  academy  school 
facilities (and expertise) with the wider community (Curtis, 2008). On the other hand, there 
may be detrimental pupil intake effects, which stem from a changing pupil-intake in academy 
schools that are experiencing significant increases in their intake quality (see Table 7), and 
there may also be detrimental performance effects, which stem (again) from the changing 
pupil-intake  quality  in  academy  schools  and  also  from  a  teacher  recruitment  policy  in 
academies that targets some of the most talented teachers in their neighbouring schools.
21 It 
therefore becomes an empirical question as to which of these effects dominate, and we 
formulate our tests in this light. 
 
 
                                                 
21 It is thought that teachers will be drawn in the academy schools due to the higher remuneration packages on 
offer (National Audit Office 2007). We find results that (on average) teachers in academies get paid 13% more 
than teachers in other state-maintained secondary schools.  
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Neighbouring Schools and Pupil Intake 
In  Table  12  we  investigate  whether  or  not  an  academy  school  conversion  has  an 
impact on the pupil-intake of neighbouring schools. The results in the Table use six different 
specifications to report estimates of the impact of an academy school conversion on the pupil 
intake of neighbouring schools. We begin with the raw difference-in-difference in column (1). 
We add time-varying controls in column (2). In column (3), we take account of the fact that 
different cohorts of academies experience different treatment doses. That is, we calculate a 
separate estimate for each of the seven cohorts of neighbouring school in our treatment group. 
In column (4), we place the first five cohorts of neighbouring school into an early group and 
we place the remaining two cohorts of neighbouring school into a late group. In column (5), 
we place each neighbouring school into a group that reflects the pre-academy type of the 
academy school that originally made them a neighbouring school. Finally, in column (6), we 
place each neighbouring school into a group that reflects both the pre-academy type of the 
academy that originally made them a neighbouring school and the early/late group that they 
belong. 
  The  estimated  coefficients  in  the  Table  show  that  (on  average)  there  has  been  a 
significant decrease in the KS2 test scores for the year 7 pupils who have enrolled into the 
neighbouring  schools.  This  suggests  that  (on  average)  the  schools  that  are  neighbours  to 
schools that convert to an academy school experience a sharp and significant decrease in the 
‘quality’ of their pupil intake at year 7. More specifically, the estimates suggest that higher 
ability pupils are substituting away from the neighbouring schools to the academy school. 
Column (1) shows that the key stage 2 total points score of the year 7 pupils enrolled into a 
neighbouring school is (on average) a significant 0.037 standard deviations lower due to the  
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academy conversion. The intake quality (on average) significantly reduces by 0.038 standard 
deviations when we add the controls in column (2). The estimates in column (3) show that the 
quality of intake measured by primary school test scores seems to have behaved in a (broadly) 
similar way across the different cohorts of neighbouring school. In column (4), the ‘early’ 
neighbouring schools (cohorts 1 to 5, in school years 2002/3 to 2006/7) saw a reduction in the 
KS2 performance of their year 7 intake by a marginally significant 0.033 standard deviations, 
as compared to a significant reduction of 0.050 standard deviations in the ‘later’ neighbouring 
schools (cohorts 6 to 7, in school years 2007/08 to 2008/09). Column (5) shows there is some 
variation in the estimated academy effects. We see that there has been a significant decrease 
in  the  intake  quality  in  the  schools  that  are  neighbours  to  either  foundation  schools  that 
convert to an academy or community schools that convert to an academy. In column (6), we 
also see that there is some variation in the estimated academy effects for the early cohort 
conversions compared to the later cohort conversions within each school type that converts to 
an academy school. The column shows the overall significant  decrease on quality of the 
intake in neighbouring schools is largely being driven by early cohort academy conversions 
that  were  previously  community  schools;  later  cohort  academy  conversions  that  were 
previously  foundation  schools;  later  cohort  academy  conversions  that  were  previously 
voluntary aided schools and later cohort academy conversions that were previously a CTC 
school.  
Neighbouring Schools and Pupil Performance 
  Finally, we look at whether an academy school conversion has an impact on the KS4 
pupil performance of neighbouring schools. This is considered in Table 13, which is set-up in 
the same as way as Table 12. Column (1) shows that an academy school conversion  (on  
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average) has an insignificant impact on the performance of neighbouring schools. This is 
largely unchanged with the addition of the controls in column (2). The estimates in column 
(3)  shows  that  pupil  performance  measured  by  the  proportion  of  pupils  achieving  the 
equivalent of five or more GCSEs including English and Maths is substantially higher in the 
neighbouring schools due to the early cohort academy conversions compared to the pupil 
performance in the neighbouring schools due to the later cohort academy conversions. In 
column (4), the ‘early’  neighbouring schools (cohorts 1 to  5, in  school  years 2002/03  to 
2006/07)  saw  an  increase  in  the  KS4  performance  of  their  pupils  by  a  significant  0.054 
standard deviations, as compared to a significant reduction of 0.091 standard deviations in the 
KS4 performance of ‘later’ neighbouring schools (cohorts 6 to 7, in school years 2007/08 to 
2008/09). In column (5) and column (6), we see that there is some variation in the estimated 
academy effects both across and within academy schools depending on their pre-academy 
type. We see that there have been significant improvements in the KS4 pupil performance in 
the  schools  that  are  neighbours  to  either  early  academy  cohort  conversions  that  were 
previously  community  schools  or  early  academy  cohort  conversions  that  were  previously 
voluntary aided schools. However, there have been significant reductions in the KS4 pupil 
performance in the schools that are neighbours to later academy cohort conversion that were 
previously  community  schools;  later  academy  cohort  conversions  that  were  previously 
voluntary  controlled  schools;  later  academy  cohort  conversions  that  were  previously 
foundation schools or later academy cohort conversions that were previously a CTC. 
  Table 13 shows that it is possible for neighbouring schools to experience significant 
improvements in their KS4 performance despite the reduction in the ‘quality’ of their pupil 
intake.  That  is,  the  beneficial  performance  effects,  which  stem  from  increased  
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choice/competition and also from the sharing of the academy school facilities (and expertise) 
with the wider community (Curtis 2008), seem to outweigh the detrimental effects, which 
stem  from  the  increased  pupil  intake  quality  in  academy  schools  (and  the  corresponding 
reduction in the pupil-intake quality in the neighbouring schools) and also from a teacher 
recruitment  policy  in  academies  that  targets  some  of  the  most  talented  teachers  in  their 
neighbouring schools.  
A logical question to ask (given this result) is why is it occurring? There is a strong 
relationship between the KS4 performance improvements in the academy schools and the 
KS4 performance improvements in the neighbouring schools. We do not believe that this is a 
coincidence: it suggests that it is possible for performance improvements in an academy to 
generate beneficial effects on their neighbouring schools. This seems likely to have come via 
the increased choice/competition  mechanism  that has  scope to  deliver  significant positive 
external effects from academy conversion.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study a high profile case – the introduction of academy schools into 
the English secondary school sector – that has allowed schools to gain more autonomy and 
flexible governance by changing their school structure. We consider the impact of academy 
school conversion on their pupil intake and pupil performance. In addition to this, we also 
examine a possible external effect operating through an impact on the pupil intake and pupil 
performance of neighbouring schools. 
The gradual introduction of academy schools has been a controversial area of schools 
policy ever since the first clutch of academies opened in September 2002. On one side of the  
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debate on academies – and more generally on the policy of granting schools more autonomy – 
you will find fierce supporters who passionately believe that academies (increased autonomy) 
will sharpen economic incentives for all staff to do better. In addition to this, it will also allow 
the school to pursue innovative schooling policies that drive up the educational attainment of 
their pupils. On the other side of the debate on academies – and more generally on the policy 
of granting schools more autonomy – you will find fierce critics who campaign against the 
policy of academies because they believe that it will not work and that they are a way of 
(implicitly)  privatising  the  education  system  in  England  –  leading  to  increased  social 
segregation.  In  this  paper,  we  have  attempted  to  offer  some  robust  evidence  that  can  be 
informative for resolving this dispute. 
We bypass the selection bias that is inherent in the previous evaluations of academy 
schools by comparing the outcomes of interest in academy schools to a selected group of 
comparison schools. This group consists of a matched sample of state-maintained schools that 
go on to become academies after our sample period ends. This approach allows us to produce 
a well-balanced treatment and control group. We then estimate the impact of an academy 
conversion on our four outcomes of interest – the pupil intake in academy schools; the pupil 
performance in academy schools; the pupil intake in neighbouring schools; and the pupil 
performance in neighbouring schools – by comparing the average change in these outcomes 
(before  and  after  the  academy  conversion)  relative  to  our  selected  group  of  comparison 
schools. Using this method, we can exploit the variation in the degree of school autonomy – 
due to the academy conversion – to isolate the impact on our four outcome of interest. 
Our  results  suggest  that  (on  average)  schools  respond  to  being  granted  increased 
autonomy (through the academy conversion) by sharply increasing the ‘quality’ of their pupil- 
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intake at year 7. However, this result is (largely) driven by the early cohorts of schools that 
converted to an academy school. In addition to this, we also find results showing that only the 
early  cohorts  of  schools  that  convert  to  academies  experience  significant  performance 
improvements. However, we believe that the performance improvements are a function of 
time and have scope to be replicated in later cohorts of schools that convert to an academy if 
they are given more time. Both of these results have been subject to a number of robustness 
checks and are strongest for the schools that experience the largest increase in the degree of 
their school autonomy (resulting from the academy conversion). 
When we look at external effects on neighbouring schools, our results suggest that (on 
average) neighbouring schools experience a sharp and significant decrease in the ‘quality’ of 
their pupil intake at year 7. This estimated academy effects on the pupil intake ‘quality’ in 
neighbouring schools is (broadly) consistent across different cohorts of neighbouring school. 
In addition to this, we also find that it is possible for neighbouring schools to experience 
significant improvements in their pupil performance despite the reduction in the ‘quality’ of 
their pupil intake. This seems to occur (mainly) in the neighbours of academy schools that 
experience large significant improvements in their pupil performance. We do not believe that 
this  is  a  coincidence:  it  suggests  that  it  is  possible  for  performance  improvements  in  an 
academy to generate significant beneficial external effects on their neighbouring schools. 
In essence, these results paint a (relatively) positive picture of the academy schools 
that were introduced by the Labour government of 1997-2010. In further work, we plan to 
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Table 1 - Typology of English Secondary Schools 
 
   
Characteristics of School Governance 
 









responsible for most 
School policies  Fee-Charging 
           
Registered 
independent school
a      
Academy school
b      
City Technology 
College
c      
Voluntary aided 
school
d      
Foundation school
e      
Voluntary controlled 
school
f      
Community school
g      
      
 
Notes: 
a - Registered independent schools are independent of the Local Education Authority (LEA), and are fee-charging. 
b - Academy schools are all ability independent specialist schools, which do not charge fees, and are not maintained by the Local Education Authority (LEA). Academies only 
follow the national curriculum in English, Maths, Science and ICT [DfES, 2007]. They are established by Sponsors from business, faith or voluntary groups, who work in 
partnership with central government. Sponsors and the DfE provide the capital costs for the Academy. Running costs are met by the DfE in accordance with the number of pupils, 
at a similar level to that provided by LEAs for maintained schools serving similar catchment areas.  
c - City Technology Colleges are all ability independent schools, which do not charge fees, and are not maintained by the Local Education Authority (LEA). Their curriculum has a 
strong technological, scientific and practical bias (in addition to following the national curriculum) [see Whitty et al., 1993]. They are established by Sponsors from business, faith 
or voluntary groups, who work in partnership with central government. Sponsors and the DfE provide the capital costs for the CTC. Running costs are met by the DfE in 
accordance with the number of pupils, at a similar level to that provided by LEAs for maintained schools serving similar catchment areas. 
d - Voluntary aided schools are maintained by the Local Education Authority (LEA). The foundation (generally religious) appoints most of the governing body.  The governing 
body is then responsible for admissions, employing the school staff, and the foundation will normally own the school’s land and buildings (apart from the playing fields which are 
normally owned by the LEA). 
e - Foundation schools are maintained by the Local Education Authority (LEA). The foundation (generally religious) appoints some – but not most – of the governing body. The 
governing body is then responsible for admissions, employing the school staff, and either the foundation or the governing body will own the school’s land and buildings. 
f - Voluntary controlled schools are maintained by the Local Education Authority (LEA). The foundation (generally religious) appoints some – but not most – of the governing 
body. The LA continues to be the admissions authority. The governing body will employ school staff, and the foundation will normally own the school’s land and buildings (apart 
from the playing fields which are normally owned by the LEA). 
g - Community schools are maintained by the Local Education Authority (LEA). The LEA is responsible for admissions, employing the school staff, and it also owns the school’s 
land and buildings.  
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Table 2 - Introduction of Academy Schools, 2001/2-2008-9 
 
     
Number (Percent) of Schools by Type 
  
                  
2001/2  2002/3  2003/4  2004/5  2005/6  2006/7  2007/8  2008/9 
                       
                 
Academy school  0 (0.0)  3 (0.1)  12 (0.4)  17 (0.5)  27 (0.9)  46 (1.5)  83 (2.7)  130 (4.3) 
City Technology 
College  15 (0.5)  15 (0.5)  14 (0.5)  14 (0.5)  11 (0.4)  10 (0.3)  5 (0.2)  3 (0.1) 
Voluntary aided 
school  510 (16.2)  514 (16.5)  517 (16.7)  523 (16.8)  519 (16.8)  512 (16.7)  517 (16.6)  508 (16.7) 
Foundation school  499 (15.8)  499 (16.1)  501 (16.2)  502 (16.1)  546 (17.7)  548 (17.9)  657 (21.1)  726 (23.9) 
Voluntary controlled 
school  97 (3.1)  96 (3.1)  95 (3.1)  95 (3.1)  89 (2.2)  87 (2.8)  85 (2.7)  82 (2.7) 
Community school  2030 (64.4)  1982 (63.8)  1959 (63.2)  1958 (63.0)  1891 (61.3)  1857 (60.7)  1764 (56.7)  1594 (52.4) 
                          
  3151  3109  3098  3109  3083  3060  3111  3043  Total 
                          
 
Notes:  Source – School Performance Tables. 






















All Academies (Cohorts 
1- Cohorts 10)  12  5  12  17  35  3  158 
Cohort 1 Academies   0  0  0  1  0  0  2 
Cohort 2 Academies   1  0  1  0  0  0  7 
Cohort 3 Academies   2  0  0  0  0  0  3 
Cohort 4 Academies   0  0  3  2  0  1  4 
Cohort 5 Academies   1  0  1  2  0  0  15 
Cohort 6 Academies   5  2  5  4  5  0  16 
Cohort 7 Academies   3  3  2  0  10  1  28 
Cohort 8 Academies   0  0  0  2  11  1  44 
Cohort 9 Academies   0  0  0  6  8  0  39 
Cohort 10 Academies  0  0  0  0  1  0  0 
               




Table 4 – Pre-Treatment Characteristics 
 















































(Cohorts 1 – Cohorts 





Cohort 1 Academies  0.440  0.278  0.286  3.033  0.127  70.347  710.667  42.500  2.638  31.933  7.100  3 (3) 
Cohort 2 Academies  0.455  0.356  0.444  2.265  0.150  70.356  758.294  48.571  3.922  27.318  9.524  8 (7) 
Cohort 3 Academies  0.359  0.241  0.268  3.261  0.141  75.130  805.000  49.200  3.477  24.622  8.972  3 (3) 
Cohort 4 Academies  0.294  0.222  0.243  1.731  0.340  78.850  875.838  54.948  2.792  20.613  7.608  10 (10) 
Cohort 5 Academies  0.411  0.284  0.327  3.155  0.198  73.600  905.315  53.136  3.407  26.024  8.524  18 (13) 
Cohort 6 Academies  0.280  0.224  0.192  2.155  0.277  76.180  720.318  52.494  3.261  25.213  7.985  30 (27) 
Cohort 7 Academies  0.232  0.191  0.142  2.456  0.276  77.301  684.620  55.981  2.908  23.011  8.109  41 (39) 
Cohort 8 Academies  0.283  0.209  0.138  2.611  0.250  76.419  775.322  61.642  2.564  24.667  8.196  57 (50) 
Cohort 9 Academies  0.264  0.208  0.152  2.145  0.244  76.294  652.781  51.880  3.279  24.888  7.813  53 (47) 
Cohort 10 Academies  0.236  0.193  0.031  1.783  0.186  76.908  528.417  39.717  2.195  29.967  8.833  1 (0) 
All Other types of 








School  0.162  0.134  0.189  0.891  0.557  84.460  716.033  58.102  1.918  12.990  6.280 
 
517 
Foundation School  0.133  0.108  0.142  1.021  0.552  84.230  823.116  67.331  2.016  13.763  6.370  705 
Voluntary Controlled 
School  0.125  0.093  0.099  1.024  0.557  84.328  857.353  67.579  2.332  13.027  6.331 
 
88 
Community School  0.194  0.156  0.138  1.405  0.420  80.840  787.565  62.292  2.580  17.674  6.994  1758 
                         
 
Notes: Same sample of schools as Table 2 and Table 3, except the number of academies in each cohort is reduced we have no pre-treatment data for the 17 academies that are either new 





Table 5 – Balancing Tests 
 
 
Notes: * Denotes significance at five percent. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Same sample of schools as Table 2 and Table 3, 




















































Panel A: Before 
balancing 
procedures               
 
       
Current academies 
(treatment group)  113  0.285  0.222  0.201  2.442  0.263  76.285  743.046  54.118  3.109  24.118  8.153 
Future academies  
(control group)  111  0.273  0.209  0.144  2.371  0.246  76.360  712.293  56.605  2.919  24.814  8.008 
Difference 
(Standard Error)  -  0.012 
(0.018) 
















-0.695           
(1.336) 
0.145     
(0.208) 
 
   
 
           
     
Panel B: After 
balancing 
procedures 
   
 
           
     
Current academies 
(treatment group)  102  0.277  0.220  0.208  2.353  0.273  76.673  761.512  55.550  3.000  23.532  8.047 
Future academies  




























Table 6 – Pre-Treatment Trends 
 
 
  Key Stage 2 Test Scores  Key Stage 4 Performance 
  (1)  (2) 
     
A. Time-trends     
Time Trend  0.434 (0.054)*  0.011 (0.001)* 
Academy X Time Trend  0.137 (0.084)  0.001 (0.003) 
     
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
     
R-Squared  0.888  0.855 
Sample Size  1242  1242 
     
B. Levels     
Academy X 2003  -0.386 (0.471)  0.008 (0.011) 
Academy X 2004  -0.163 (0.473)  0.009 (0.011) 
Academy X 2005  0.457 (0.507)  0.013 (0.013) 
Academy X 2006  -0.178 (0.506)  0.011 (0.014) 
Academy X 2007   0.749 (0.529)  0.007 (0.017) 
Academy X 2008  0.602 (0.596)  -0.001 (0.031) 
     
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
     
R-Squared  0.890  0.858 
Sample Size  1242  1242 
     
  F (6, 198) = 1.99  F ( 6, 198) = 0.24 
  Prob>F = 0.068  Prob>F = 0.946 
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Table 7 - Academy Schools and Pupil Intake 
(Key Stage 2 Standardised Total Points Score) 
 
 
  Key Stage 2 Test Scores 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Academy  0.224 (0.077)  0.202 (0.074)     
Academy, Cohort 1      0.572 (0.111)   
Academy, Cohort 2      0.674 (0.233)   
Academy, Cohort 3      0.233 (0.351)   
Academy, Cohort 4      0.096 (0.256)   
Academy, Cohort 5      0.364 (0.153)   
Academy, Cohort 6      0.144 (0.108)   
Academy, Cohort 7      0.044 (0.106)   
Academy, Early        0.311 (0.123) 
Academy, Late        0.103 (0.081) 
         
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R-Squared  0.853  0.857  0.859  0.858 
Sample Size 
 
1497  1497  1497  1497 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables are:  % of pupils eligible for Free-School-Meals (FSM), % of pupils who 
are  White-Ethnic,  Ratio  of  total  pupils to  qualified  teachers,  %  of  pupils with  Special  Educational  Needs (SEN)  with  a  statement,  %  of  pupils with  Special  Educational 
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Table 8 - Academy Schools and GCSE Performance  
(standardised proportion of pupils enrolled into the school who achieve the equivalent of five or more GCSEs at A*-C grade 
including English and Maths) 
 
 
  Key Stage 4 Test Scores 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Academy  0.095 (0.055)  0.071 (0.055)       
Academy, Cohort 1      0.179 (0.270)     
Academy, Cohort 2      0.122 (0.133)     
Academy, Cohort 3      0.399 (0.075)     
Academy, Cohort 4      0.271 (0.112)     
Academy, Cohort 5      0.079 (0.135)     
Academy, Cohort 6      -0.012 (0.114)     
Academy, Cohort 7      -0.063 (0.074)     
Academy, Early        0.181 (0.075)  0.184 (0.072) 
Academy, Late        -0.029 (0.076)  -0.019 (0.074) 
           
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
KS2 Control  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
R-Squared  0.850  0.854  0.856  0.856  0.865  
Sample Size 
 
1497  1497  1497  1497  1497 
 
















































All Academies (Cohorts 
1- Cohorts 10)  0  0  12  16  31  2  138 
Cohort 1 Academies   0  0  0  1  0  0  2 
Cohort 2 Academies   0  0  1  0  0  0  6 
Cohort 3 Academies   0  0  0  0  0  0  3 
Cohort 4 Academies   0  0  3  2  0  1  4 
Cohort 5 Academies   0  0  1  1  0  0  11 
Cohort 6 Academies   0  0  5  4  4  0  14 
Cohort 7 Academies   0  0  2  0  10  1  26 
Cohort 8 Academies   0  0  0  2  10  0  38 
Cohort 9 Academies   0  0  0  6  7  0  34 
Cohort 10 Academies  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
               




Table 10 – Heterogeneity by Autonomy Distance and Early/Late Conversion 
 
 
  Key Stage 2 Test Scores  Key Stage 4 Test Scores 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Academy, CTC  -0.301 (0.135)    -0.081 (0.090)  -0.074 (0.092)     
Academy, CTC, Early    -0.490 (0.202)      0.003 (0.140)  0.003 (0.137) 
Academy, CTC, Late    -0.135 (0.131)      -0.172 (0.112)  -0.159 (0.122) 
Academy, Voluntary Aided  0.420 (0.258)    0.076 (0.150)  0.108 (0.147)     
Academy, Voluntary Aided, Early    0.067 (0.356)      0.254 (0.234)  0.287 (0.218) 
Academy, Voluntary Aided, Late    0.801 (0.213)      -0.113 (0.100)  -0.082 (0.121) 
Academy, Foundation  -0.162 (0.174)    -0.275 (0.243)  -0.227 (0.226)      
Academy, Foundation, Early    -      -  - 
Academy, Foundation, Late    -0.174 (0.176)      -0.285 (0.244)  -0.237 (0.227) 
Academy, Voluntary Controlled  0.462 (0.090)    0.245 (0.190)  0.263 (0.194)     
Academy, Voluntary Controlled, Early    0.547 (0.049)      0.434 (0.040)  0.453 (0.043) 
Academy, Voluntary Controlled, Late    0.287 (0.061)      -0.128 (0.048)  -0.116 (0.048) 
Academy, Community School  0.335 (0.083)    0.152 (0.061)  0.149 (0.059)     
Academy, Community School, Early    0.534 (0.126)      0.200 (0.089)  0.200 (0.085) 
Academy, Community School, Late    0.138 (0.356)      0.098 (0.081)  0.092 (0.081) 
             
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
KS2 Control  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
             
R-Squared  0.863  0.868  0.857  0.866  0.858  0.867 
Sample Size  1497  1497  1497  1497  1497  1497 
             
 
Notes: As for Table 7. 
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
(8)  (9) 
   
       
   
   





end in 2007/08 
Dropping 10% of 
control academies 
based on distance. 
Fake Policy, 
T-5 









KS2 mean test score in 
English, Maths and 
Science (standardised)  
Limit all cohorts of 
academies to a max of 1 
year post treatment 
                   
Academy, Early  0.311     
(0.123) 
0.290     
(0.117) 
0.287          
(0.122) 
-0.013    
(0.065) 
-0.011    
(0.071) 
0.309     
(0.124) 
0.287        
(0.121) 
0.302                        
(0.117) 
0.307                        
(0.122) 
Academy, Late  0.103     
(0.081) 
0.165     
(0.124) 
0.129          
(0.108) 
-0.081     
(0.060) 
-0.061     
(0.066) 
0.079     
(0.078) 
0.101        
(0.081) 
0.116                        
(0.082) 
0.120                        
(0.085) 
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.858  0.876  0.862  0.907  0.879  0.857  0.859  0.867  0.870 
Sample Size  1497  1315  1441  1210  1137  1501  1496  1497  1354 
                   





end in 2007/08 
Dropping 10% of 
control academies 
based on distance. 
Fake Policy, 
T-5 








Original Specification, 5 + 
GCSEs at A*-C grade 
including English and 
Maths (standardised) 
Limit all cohorts of 
academies to a max of 1 
year post treatment 
                   






0.038     
(0.064) 
0.001     
(0.054) 
0.176     
(0.074) 
0.169            
(0.075) 
0.175                         
(0.073) 
0.058                        
(0.068) 






0.014     
(0.072) 
-0.037    
(0.071) 
-0.020     
(0.076) 
-0.033          
(0.076) 
-0.029                         
(0.072) 
0.029                        
(0.072) 
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-Squared  0.856  0.881  0.856  0.890  0.800  0.856  0.856  0.864  0.861 
Sample Size  1497  1315  1441  1225  1153  1501  1496  1497  1354 
 




Table 12 - Neighbouring Schools (Within 3 Miles) and Pupil Intake 
(Key Stage 2 Standardised Total Points Score) 
 
 
  Key Stage 2 Test Scores 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (6)  
             
Nr_Academy  -0.037 (0.016)  -0.038 (0.015)         
Nr_Academy, Cohort 1      -0.096 (0.063)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 2      -0.038 (0.035)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 3      -0.099 (0.063)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 4      0.016 (0.032)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 5      -0.023 (0.030)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 6      -0.043 (0.032)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 7      -0.059 (0.031)       
Nr_Academy, Early        -0.033 (0.019)     
Nr_Academy, Late        -0.050 (0.024)     
Nr_Academy, CTC          -0.035 (0.040)   
Nr_Academy, CTC, Early            -0.005 (0.049) 
Nr_Academy, CTC, Late            -0.133 (0.051) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Aided          -0.005 (0.038)   
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Aided, Early            0.011 (0.040) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Aided, Late            -0.205 (0.074) 
Nr_Academy, Foundation          -0.199 (0.060)   
Nr_Academy, Foundation, Early            - 
Nr_Academy, Foundation, Late            -0.199 (0.060) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Controlled          0.018 (0.076)   
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Controlled, Early            0.065 (0.083) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Controlled, Late            -0.210 (0.129) 
Nr_Academy, Community School          -0.041 (0.018)   
Nr_Academy, Community School, Early            -0.055 (0.022) 
Nr_Academy, Community School, Late            -0.013 (0.029) 
             
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
R-Squared  0.936  0.937  0.937  0.937  0.937  0.937 
Sample Size  7937  7937  7937  7937  7937  7937 
             
 





Table 13 - Neighbouring Schools (Within 3 Miles) and GCSE Performance  
(standardised proportion of pupils enrolled into the school who achieve the equivalent of five or more GCSEs at A*-C grade 
including English and Maths) 
 
  Key Stage 4 Test Scores     
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)   (6)  
             
Nr_Academy  0.012 (0.015)  0.010 (0.015)         
Nr_Academy, Cohort 1      0.067 (0.049)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 2      0.144 (0.032)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 3      0.098 (0.042)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 4      0.014 (0.033)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 5      -0.010 (0.032)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 6      -0.096 (0.027)       
Nr_Academy, Cohort 7      -0.089 (0.038)       
Nr_Academy, Early        0.054 (0.018)     
Nr_Academy, Late        -0.091 (0.023)     
Nr_Academy, CTC          -0.003 (0.031)   
Nr_Academy, CTC, Early            0.029 (0.037) 
Nr_Academy, CTC, Late            -0.108 (0.040) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Aided          0.094 (0.036)   
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Aided, Early            0.096 (0.038) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Aided, Late            0.066 (0.088) 
Nr_Academy, Foundation          -0.196 (0.080)   
Nr_Academy, Foundation, Early            - 
Nr_Academy, Foundation, Late            -0.202 (0.080) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Controlled          0.025 (0.082)   
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Controlled, Early            0.080 (0.092) 
Nr_Academy, Voluntary Controlled, Late            -0.249 (0.104) 
Nr_Academy, Community School          0.015 (0.018)   
Nr_Academy, Community School, Early            0.048 (0.022) 
Nr_Academy, Community School, Late            -0.058 (0.026) 
             
School Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Control Variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
R-Squared  0.942  0.942  0.942  0.942  0.942  0.942 
Sample Size  7937  7937  7937  7937  7937  7937 
             
 










Dependent Variable: Academy indicator 
(This is equal to 0 for future academies; 
It is equal to 1 for current academies)  
Proportion Non-White 
 
0.976                                                   
(0.246) 




Proportion eligible for FSM 
-0.549 
(0.414) 








































Case  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Cohort 1  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A  A  A  A  A  A 
 
Fake  P  A  A  A  A  A 
              Cohort 2  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A  A  A  A  A 
 
Fake  P  P  A  A  A  A  A 
            Cohort 3  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A  A  A  A 
 
Fake  P  P  P  A  A  A  A  A 
          Cohort 4  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A  A  A 
 
Fake  P  P  P  P  A  A  A  A 
          Cohort 5  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A  A 
 
Fake  P  P  P  P  P  A  A  A 
          Cohort 6  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A 
 
Fake  P  P  P  P  P  P  A  A 
          Cohort 7  Actual  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  P  A 








Dependent Variable: Neighbouring 
School indicator (This is equal to 0 for 
future neighbouring schools; It is equal 
to 1 for current neighbouring schools)  
Proportion eligible for FSM 
 





% half days missed due to unauthorised 
absences 
-0.086 
(0.021) 
 
 
 
Sample Size 
 
5953 
 
 
 
 